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Executive Summary  
 
After five years, much uncertainty remains in the Solomon Islands over the 
future of RAMSI. As a security force it still enjoys broad support, but there 
are serious local objections to its role and its semi-permanent nature has 
brought new problems. 
 
In the Solomon Islands there is one group that would like to see the back of 
the Australian-dominated RAMSI, another group that would like to divert 
RAMSI into broader aid programs, and a group in between, which wants the 
security reassurance of RAMSI but are hurt by ‘aid trauma’: an inflationary 
bubble economy, with failures in institution building and the relative 
deprivation that accompanies most such large scale, foreign aid ‘caravans’.  
 
This report explains the origins of RAMSI and, by use of available evidence, 
including informed local voices, discusses: 
 
· the phenomenon of ‘aid trauma’: the harmful ‘side-effects’ of longer term, 
conspicuously wealthy foreign occupations which introduce an 
inflationary bubble economy, weaken domestic institutions and generate 
resentment at ‘relative deprivation’; 
· important differences between short term, emergency aid and longer term 
developmental projects – the latter with their ‘governance’ pretensions 
carry a greater likelihood of unwanted interference in the emerging 
nation’s self-governance processes; 
· tension between Australian arguments of RAMSI as a ‘state building’ force 
in a ‘failing state’ and the predominant Solomon Islander view of RAMSI 
as neighbourly assistance; 
· the risk of re-igniting tension and resistance if the scope of RAMSI were to 
be widened – a risk not necessarily faced by new bilateral aid programs; 
and 
· the contribution to waste and ‘aid trauma’ of RAMSI’s bureaucratic inertia 
and lack of an exit strategy. 
 
The Australian role in RAMSI is constrained by its multilateral character and 
by bureaucratic inertia. Many of the aid workers, soldiers, p olice, and 
contracted companies have a strong interest in maintaining their mission. 
Australian investment groups maintain their demands for ‘deep intervention’ 
through land commercialisation and privatisation. However, following the 
conflict between the S ogavare and Howard governments, Australian 
administrators speak more cautiously about RAMSI’s objectives.  
 
This report suggests there are limits to RAMSI, and that it should be 
gradually wound down, at a time when Solomon Islander communities 
express their confidence in resuming the task of self-governance and nation 
building. There are limits to RAMSI, and it would best not be confused with 
new bilateral aid programs.  
 
 
 
 ‘The Australians arrived, commando style and 
heavily armed, and secured the airstrip as 
though it were Afghanistan. They were met by 
children, a choir and gifts.’  
John Roughan, 2008 
 
Introduction 
 
Australian aid and intervention has been passing 
through a period of changing rationales, strongly 
influenced by the middle east wars and new , often 
paternalistic views of post-conflict ‘state building’. Yet 
behind the new rationales are old agendas: establishing 
foreign investment privileges, strategic positioning, and 
access to natural resources. These form a familiar 
backdrop to the more nobly stated goal of simply 
helping one’s neighbours. 
 
At the same time, island states in the South Pacific have 
experienced their own upheavals to do with nation 
building, modernisation pressures and meeting the 
expectations of their growing and young populations. 
The 2003 Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) was unusual in that it was invited by a 
new and weak state, it was a multilateral project 
organised through the Pacific Island Forum, yet it was 
dominated by Australia.  
 
After five years, and with the evaporation of initial 
rationales that instability in the Solomon Islands might 
pose a ‘terrorist’ threat, much uncertainty remains over 
the future of RAMSI. On the one hand, RAMSI as a 
security force still enjoys broad support. On the other 
hand, it has brought a number of new problems. 
 
This report begins by explaining the origins of RAMSI, 
outlining its first five years, including the tensions of 
2006-2007 and the surveys of Solomon Islander 
responses to the foreign mission. Using the evidence of 
informed local voices, it discusses ‘aid trauma’, the 
harmful side-effects of a long term, conspicuously 
wealthy foreign occupation. The elements of this aid 
trauma are: an inflationary bubble economy, failures in 
domestic institution building and training, and relative 
deprivation. As a means of reflecting on the future of 
RAMSI, this report juxtaposes Australian ‘state 
building’ notions (including some calls for deeper 
intervention) with Solomon Islander views on the 
respective roles of RAMSI and their relatively new self-
governing society. Progress in standards of living in the 
Solomon Islands since independence is then considered, 
before moving to a final consideration of the future of 
RAMSI. The report suggests there are limits to RAMSI, 
and that it should be gradually wound down and not 
confused with bilateral aid relations. 
 
1. Crisis in the Solomons 
 
In 1998 the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA), 
later known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), 
took up arms to enforce long standing grievances over 
land and economic opportunities against settlers, 
mainly from the neighbouring island of Malaita. These 
actions followed years of economic pressures from low 
commodity prices, unsustainable logging and public 
service cuts (Bennett 2002: 10).  
 
Although migration and land acquisition was often 
accompanied by traditional agreements, family 
reunions of settlers extended the pressures on land. 
When Guadalcanal people looked for new gardens 
“they often found their land pockmarked by Malaitan 
settlements” (Bennett 2002: 8). Malaitans had been the 
“mainstay of an indentured labour trade”, first to 
Queensland then to Fiji and then within the Solomons, 
when the plantations were developed (Moore 2007: 
173). 
 
Land and other grievances had been stated in 
Guadalcanal petitions of 1988 and 1998. The 1988 claim 
stressed an end to violence against Guadalcanal people, 
repatriation of those who occupied Guadalcanal 
traditional lands, a fairer system of education and 
health services and “that future major economic 
development projects be accommodated elsewhere” 
(Billy Gatu 1988: 195-6). Nothing was done, even over a 
number of highlighted murders of Guadalcanal people. 
They complained they had been left with ‘no justice’. 
The subsequent 1998 ‘Demands by the Bona Fide and 
Indigenous People of Guadalcanal’, led by the 
Guadalcanal Provincial Premier, called for 
constitutional change, state government for the 
provinces, return of alienated traditional lands, 
resource and plantation rents for the province and 
landowners, controls on internal migration and 
compensation for murdered Guadalcanal citizens 
(Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly 1998: 197-203). The 
complaint that Guadalcanal (Guale) people had not 
benefited from development on their island was strong, 
and came not only from those whose traditional lands 
were affected, but from those in the more remote areas 
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(such as the southern Weather Coast) who had been cut 
off from the development of roads, basic services and 
commercial opportunities. 
 
With the grievance of these claims, the GRA/IFM began 
terrorising Malaitan communities (some of whom had 
intermarried with Guale people and so established their 
families’ own customary rights to land) on the island of 
Guadalcanal. At first shops were ransacked and 
migrant workers were chased from plantations and 
farms. There were several attacks and murders. 
Warriors in traditional gear invaded schools and 
villages and gave the Malaitans (sometimes their 
friends and cousins) a set time to leave (Fraenkel 2004: 
53-55). Malaitans were the main victims of these 1998-99 
evictions. By November 1999 over 35,000 people (34% 
of the Guadalcanal population) had been displaced 
from their homes; 70% of these were from rural areas 
(mainly the north coast) and 30% from the capital, 
Honiara (census data in Fraenkel 2004: 55-56) 
 
Table 1: A chronology of significant events 
 
Solomon Islands gains independence 
from Britain 
1978 
First Guadalcanal petition over settlers 
and justice matters 
1988 
Second Guadalcanal petition – crisis  
erupts 
1998 
Solomon Islands Government (SIG) 
calls for outside assistance 
1999-2003 
RAMSI intervenes 2003 
Open tensions between SIG and 
Australia over RAMSI 
2006-2007 
Both SIG and Australian Governments 
change 
2007 
 
Peace talks, brokered by outside parties, attempted to 
resolve the crisis, through a series of agreements. The 
Honiara accord of June 1999, signed by Prime Minister 
Bart Ulufa’alu and the Premiers of Guadalcanal and 
Malaita (but not GRA/IFM leaders), offered no promises 
of immunity from pr osecution for the GRA/IFM 
militants, but did lead Malaitan leaders to largely 
accept Malaitan evictions from Guadalcanal, with the 
condition that compensation be paid. Taiwanese aid 
was used to help relocate displaced people. However 
by late 1999 young men from the Malaitan 
communities, with the backing of their political leaders, 
formed a Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), which sought 
revenge on the Guale militants. Fighting escalated in 
and, in a MEF orchestrated coup in June 2000, Prime 
Minister Ulufa’alu was kidnapped and forced to resign. 
The MEF, supported by large sections of the Royal 
Solomon Islands Police (RSIP), declared war on the 
GRA/IFM. ‘Payback’ escalated the crisis, so that the 
killings escalated from 10 or 20 by late 1999 to over 100 
by the end of 2000. The Gold Ridge mining operation, in 
central Guadalcanal, was shut down (Fraenkel 2004: 70, 
80, 87, 91; Moore 2007: 171). 
 
The next chance at a settlement came through peace 
talks held at Townsville, Australia in October 2000. This 
time the talks were attended by representatives from 
most of the militant groups, as well as from the national 
and provincial governments. Agreement was made to 
surrender weapons, move towards greater provincial 
autonomy and provide compensation for the displaced 
Malaitans (Fraenkel 2004: 98-100). Most of these would 
not return to Guadalcanal. There was some surrender of 
weapons. However despite calls by Prime Minister 
Manasseh Sogavare for help to enforce this accord, none 
was forthcoming. Harold Keke, leader of the Weather 
Coast IFM, renounced the Townsville agreement and 
internecine fighting broke out, both between and within 
the IFM and MEF. Conflict extended to Western 
province and included some former Bougainville 
militants. However Weather Coast militants remained 
in conflict with the ‘joint operations’ of the MEF and the 
RSIP police (Fraenkel 2004: 141-144). Due to this 
perceived alliance, the Weather Coast people in 
particular lost all confidence in their own police, the 
RSIP (Smith 2008). 
 
Canberra came at the crisis from a different perspective. 
It seems that the US-led invasion of Iraq helped change 
the Howard Government’s inclination to intervene. 
Although three successive Solomon Islands Prime 
Ministers had requested help, as late as January 2003 
Foreign Minister  Alexander Downer had said that 
sending troops to the Solomons would be “folly in the 
extreme … for how many years would such an 
occupation have to continue? And what would be the 
exit strategy?” (Downer 2003). These were reasonable 
questions. 
 
However, after participating in the US-led ‘pre-
emptive’ attack on Iraq in March 2003, on the basis 
(later proven false) that the regime possessed ‘weapons 
of mass destruction’ and could strike at any time, Prime 
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Minister Howard returned from a visit to the U.S. 
President with renewed security plans for the region 
(Kim 2003). In June, Downer launched an Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) paper on the Solomon 
Islands, in which principal author Elsina Wainwright 
suggested the small, troubled Solomon Islands could be 
a threat to Australia. The ASPI report contained five 
references to possible terrorism and twelve references 
to a ‘failed state’, the keyword in international law that 
might justify  non-invited intervention in a sovereign 
state. Australian intervention was thus said to be 
justified, even though in this case it had been invited, to 
avert the development of a “petri dish in which 
transnational and non-state security threats can develop 
and flourish” (ASPI 2003: 13).  
 
In July Prime Minister Howard claimed that “a failed 
state in our region … will jeopardise our own security. 
Rogue and failed states could become a base from 
which terrorists and transnational criminals organise 
their operations” (Grattan 2003). However, the newly 
appointed, British-born Solomon Island’s Police 
Commissioner, Bill Morrell, contradicted this, saying 
there was no basis for suggesting that the Solomons 
posed any terrorist threat to Australia (SBS 2003). 
Nevertheless, Howard claimed an “immense moral and 
humanitarian dividend” from the U.S.-led war on Iraq 
and – continuing in this self-congratulatory mode – 
asserted that Australia enjoyed “unparalleled world 
respect” for its willingness to take a stand in the 
Solomons (Howard 2003).  
 
At this point it is important to observe that, despite the 
crisis in Honiara and on disputed lands, more than 80% 
of Solomon Islanders simply got on with their lives. The 
village, traditional lands and custom demonstrated 
their powerful cohesive force, when police and 
government had collapsed (Roughan 2008). 
 
2. RAMSI: from ‘honeymoon’ to new 
tensions 
 
The formal request for intervention came from Solomon 
Islands Prime Minister Alan Kemakeza, who had been 
Minister for Forests in the mid-1990s, during the “worst 
excesses of logging” (Moore 2007: 177). Three Solomons 
Prime Ministers had previously made similar requests, 
and Kemakeza made his from a weak position. The 
timing of Australia’s response thus raised some 
questions. Did Canberra decide on the intervention, 
then invite Kemakeza’s request? Was this some sort of 
endorsement of the Kemakeza government? Whatever 
the case, the Australian change of mind led quickly to 
the mobilisation of a multi-nation group sanctioned by 
the Pacific Island Forum.  
 
The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) was an Australian-led, military and police 
dominated body that included representatives from 
several other Pacific Island Forum members: New 
Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga. 
RAMSI was authorised and indemnified through 
Solomon Islands law and broadly supported by all  
sides. A treaty between the Solomon Islands, Australia, 
New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and 
Tonga backed RAMSI (DFAT 2003).  
 
The force arrived in Honiara on 24 July, to no resistance 
and general welcome, and began a process of retrieving 
weapons and making arrests. There was little need for 
armed troops, and most of these were withdrawn in late 
2003 and early 2004 (Moore 2007: 176), leaving RAMSI a 
police dominated force. 
 
2.1 RAMSI’s foundation 
Under the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 
(2003) the Solomon Islands Government (SIG) was able 
to authorise a ‘visiting contingent’ of police, army and 
others, from other countries. These army and police 
personnel were authorised as their domestic 
counterparts and could carry and seize weapons, 
operate vehicles, use various facilities free of charge, be 
exempt from tax and other regulations and could use 
‘reasonably necessary’ force to achieve a public 
purpose. Further, they would have “immunity from 
legal proceedings” for actions that were related to their 
“official duties.” (s.17). The referring country could also 
claim authority in any ‘criminal or disciplinary’ action 
regarding their own personnel. However the Solomon 
Islands parliament would have the opportunity to 
review and maintain or revoke the assistance notice 
every year. 
 
RAMSI’s mandate was broad, and vague. Its 
“immediate objective” was to restore law and order, 
including weapons retrieval. Its three areas of work 
were defined as: “machinery of government - helping 
government better serve the people”; “economic 
      7  
   
governance – encouraging broad based economic 
growth”; and “law and justice” (RAMSI 2008).  
 
While the ‘law and justice’ role was important to 
stabilising the country, after the violence of the crisis 
period, none of RAMSI’s mandate directly addressed 
the causes of the crisis. These were rooted in land, 
ethnic accommodation, reform of the country’s 
constitutional structure, national identity and national 
institutions. John Roughan noted that land was “the 
issue” at the root of the conflict. No long term 
resolution could come without recognition of the 
centrality of land in Solomon Island village life; and 
84% of the people still lived in the village. Nor was this 
a matter that could be resolved by simple legal process, 
such as land registration (Roughan 2003), which had 
been urged by successive Australian Governments (see 
Rusanen 2005).  
 
How was RAMSI seen by the people? The Solomon 
Islands Development Trust (SIDT), probably the largest 
and best established domestic NGO in the Solomons, 
carried out a survey three weeks before the first troops 
arrived and found that “island people (2,100 town and 
provincial respondents) marked the intervention force 
with a 94% approval rate.” Later, in February 2004, 
another SIDT poll of 2,341 people in all provinces 
(including “men, women, young men and young 
women in almost equal numbers”) showed that while 
88% nationally backed RAMSI’s security effort, 74% felt 
the justice system was working better, 66% felt services 
had improved and 64% felt they were enjoying a better 
life. In other words, RAMSI was appreciated more in 
security terms. Services and well-being were arguably 
not within RAMSI’s mandate, but comments made 
suggested many local people felt they were (Roughan 
2004a). Expectations had been raised. Because some 
frustrated leaders had begun to demand that RAMSI 
“leave quickly”, the July 2005 poll of the SIDT added a 
question on whether RAMSI should leave; but 71% of 
Solomon Islanders disagreed. However 22% did agree 
that RAMSI should leave; though most felt this way just 
“a little bit”. The SIDT concluded “[Solomon Islanders] 
want the RAMSI presence to continue, to reinforce its 
work patterns and to depart only when normal life 
comes flooding back to village and town folk lives” 
(Roughan 2005). 
 
There were other surveys. In 2004 the Pacific Island 
Forum commissioned a social impact assessment of the 
peace process, reviewing law and order, economy, basic 
services and civil society. Its team interviewed over a 
hundred people (mostly Solomon Islanders), conducted 
some community meetings and made some 
recommendations for program reform. It found that 
RAMSI “has undoubtedly created a conducive climate 
within which to restore basic services” (RRRT/UNDP 
2004: viii-ix). On the economic or developmental role of 
RAMSI the report noted the high expectations of 
RAMSI but added that few people knew just “what 
RAMSI’s long-term plans are”. Further, “A repeating 
concern has been raised about the effectiveness of 
current counter-parting arrangement between RAMSI 
personnel and local DOF [finance] staff. Local staff 
members feel excluded and RAMSI personnel are not 
coaching/mentoring or transferring skills to national 
counterparts” (RRRT/UNDP 2004: 19). This complaint 
about ineffective training would be repeated later on. 
 
An eminent persons group, commissioned by the PIF, 
reviewed and congratulated RAMSI in 2005, but 
observed the “hard part lies ahead”. They stated “the 
Government and people of Solomon Islands must take 
the lead in rebuilding the nation and not waver from 
this path” (EPG 2005). This usefully refocussed 
attention on just who carried the responsibility for 
‘nation building’. 
 
2.2 The April 2006 riots 
 
A major test for RAMSI came almost three years into its 
mandate. The national elections of April 2006 and 
crowd reaction to the nomination of former Deputy 
Prime Minister Snyder Rini as Prime Minister, were 
followed by a riot in which much of Chinatown was 
burnt and RAMSI police vehicles were attacked. Some 
have observed that the riots “demonstrated the despair 
felt by many citizens when the old guard were 
returned” (Moore 2007: 193). Rini was associated with 
Kemakeza and logging corruption. Days after the riot, 
Rini lost his parliamentary support, and Manasseh 
Sogavare was nominated by MPs for his second term as 
Prime Minister. However recriminations over the riots 
put pressure on Solomon Island Government, RAMSI 
and Australian Government relations. The burning of 
Chinatown was a serious challenge to RAMSI which, 
while priding itself on restoring law and order, had 
neither anticipated nor been able to control the riots. 
Indeed, Australian police had themselves become 
targets. Bishop Terry Brown commented:  
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“The ‘spark’ that sent the rioters into central Honiara 
from Parliament, the use of tear gas by the Australian 
RAMSI contingent against the crowd around 
Parliament … needs to be investigated.  The Speaker of 
Parliament and leaders of the parties were apparently 
preparing to address the crowd and calm them down … 
[when] the RAMSI tear gas hit … It is cited as an 
example of Australian RAMSI's over-reaction to events” 
(Brown 2006). At the time of writing this report (March 
2008) the incident remained under examination by a 
Commission of Inquiry. 
 
RAMSI police pursued several politicians they 
suspected of involvement. Yet as they arrested Malaitan 
MPs Charles Dausabea and Nelson Ne’e, Prime 
Minister Sogavare ordered a formal inquiry into the 
broader causes of the riot. In the terms of reference for 
the Inquiry, Sogavare proposed examination of the 
possible role of MPs, political parties and groups but 
also “the role and responsibility of the Solomon Island 
Police Force and the Participating Police Force”. This 
upset the Australian government. Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer publicly claimed “The real motive 
of the commission of inquiry … is to ease the pressure 
on two of Mr Sogavare’s henchman, Mr Ne’e and Mr 
Dausabea, who have been arrested and are in jail.” (in 
Merritt and Walters 2006). Relations between Canberra 
and Sogavare began badly. 
 
Advising Prime Minister Sogavare to include reference 
to the possible role of RAMSI police was Australian 
lawyer Julian Moti, who in turn proposed Marcus 
Einfeld, a senior Australian lawyer, as Commissioner. 
Within weeks both men were themselves facing 
Australian criminal investigations. The Australian 
investigation into Julian Moti, under Australian extra-
territorial law, began in June and related to alleged 
child sexual abuse in Vanuatu. However Vanuatu 
Police Commissioner Patu Navoko Lui said he was 
“surprised” that the Australians had reopened an old 
case, which he considered as “cleared, finished”. A 
magistrate had dismissed these charges against Moti in 
1999 (McKenna and Dodd 2006). Moti said “I was of no 
interest or concern to them until I was nominated [as 
senior legal adviser] by PM Sogavare. [Australian 
Ambassador] Patrick Cole and company thought I was 
too independent for their liking” (National Express 
2007). Marcus Einfeld was appointed to the inquiry in 
July, but in August a Sydney-based inquiry was opened 
into his alleged lying over past speeding tickets (AAP 
2006). This minor scandal derailed him. In September, 
Sogavare replaced Einfeld and in April 2007 he revised 
the terms of reference and appointed Papua New 
Guinea lawyer Brian Brunton as Chair. The Inquiry 
began in May (STO 2007). 
 
A war of words between Honiara and Canberra, arising 
from the riots and the inquiry, put a cloud over RAMSI 
throughout 2006-2007. The Australian Government 
approach was often aggressive, using the ‘Moti affair’ 
as justification. RAMSI police even raided Prime 
Minister Sogavare’s office, in pursuit of documents for 
their Moti investigation; a highly provocative move. It 
became a test of wills between the two governments, 
with an unusual show of resistance from a Pacific 
leader. Canberra then imposed visa bans on Solomons 
Ministers wishing to visit Australia. Some constructive 
talk between the Solomons Government and RAMSI 
officials was held in that period (Forum Secretariat 
2006), but there was substantial confrontation. Sogavare 
threatened to withdraw support for RAMSI if 
Canberra’s threats were not withdrawn. A struggle 
emerged at the 2006 Pacific Island Forum (PIF) meeting, 
with Sogavare urging more PIF and less Australian 
control of RAMSI (Manning 2006). However after 
Sogavare boycotted the 2007 PIF meeting, some of his 
ministers defected, worried that communications with 
Australia would completely break down (Iroga 2008). 
Dr Derek Sikua, Sogavare’s Education Minister, was 
voted in as new Prime Minister. It was only after this 
that  the Australian visa bans on Solomons Ministers 
were removed (The Age 2008) 
 
2.3 The RAMSI surveys 2006-2007 
 
RAMSI commissioned popular surveys on its own 
performance. The summary version of the 2007 survey 
stresses a 90% support rate for RAMSI; but the detail of 
the survey is more interesting. RAMSI’s surveys were 
carried out by an Australian National University body 
in 2006 and 2007 (with another planned for 2008). 
Survey design and leadership was all Australian, while 
those who conducted the surveys were mostly Solomon 
Islanders.  
 
The 2006 ‘Pilot survey’ (disrupted by the election and 
its aftermath, it was not fully representative, covering 
1085 respondents in four of the nine provinces only, 
plus Honiara) showed economic perceptions as 
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“generally negative”, with 87% of people complaining 
of high prices and 70% saying their economic situation 
“was worse than the year before”. In security, only 36% 
regarded their villages as safe and peaceful” but 59% 
said the law and order situation had improved in the 
past year. In policing, 48% had experienced some theft 
in the past year, 28% had reported this to police and 
only 25% were satisfied (63% not satisfied) with action 
taken by police. On justice, 41% would prefer to use 
customary law to modern law and 47% said it would 
depend on the circumstances. 77% voted in the 2006 
election but 57% thought corruption in national 
government had increased (ANU Enterprise 2006: 6-9). 
This poll showed a substantial degree of dissatisfaction 
with governance. 
 
In the 2007 poll, which covered eight provinces and 
Honiara, interviewing 5,154 respondents: 35% “said 
their current financial household situation was better 
than 2 years ago and 35% said it was worse”; 81% did 
not have a health centre and 69% did not have a 
primary school in their village or community; 46% 
described their community as “safe and peaceful”, 
while 45% said law and order had improved; 89% had 
had no formal contact with the RSIP police in the last 
year; almost all (98%) had heard of RAMSI, 63% had 
seen a RAMSI officer in three past three months but 
only 12% had spoken to one. Most thought RAMSI was 
here to “keep the peace” (62%), to “improve law and 
justice” (42%), or to “arrest criminals” (22%); while 90% 
said they supported the presence of RAMSI in the 
country (ANU Enterprise 2007: 6-12). 
 
The headline figure of 90% support was repeatedly 
used by the Australian Government, but this was too 
simple. The two surveys together show that while 
RAMSI maintained a strong symbolic role (with the 
idea stronger than actual contact with RAMSI 
personnel), the RAMSI occupation period had been 
characterised by: indifferent or worsening economic 
prosects, very limited or absent basic services 
(education and health) and not even a majority 
perception of improvements in justice or law and order. 
 
In this circumstance, political leaders would do well to 
read the two RAMSI surveys in some detail, rather than 
simply quote the headline ‘90% support’ figure. The 
danger, reinforced by the tendency of Australian public 
servants to engage more in self-congratulation than self-
criticism, is that discontent and looming problems will 
be ignored. The likelihood of this is further reinforced 
by the cultural isolation of Australian RAMSI 
personnel, in particular. Australian academic Matthew 
Allen, noting the cultural gulf in discussions of RAMSI, 
and after interviewing a range of Solomon Islanders 
including former militants, observed that: “it is 
perilously dangerous to ignore the dissenting views of a 
minority of people”. Australian self-congratulation over 
RAMSI had ignored important local perspectives. The 
2006 riots and failures in policing demonstrated to 
Solomon Islanders that RAMSI was no longer 
‘infallible’. Australian officers were “the least liked” of 
all foreign police, their communications were poor and 
their heavy handed operations often contrasted with 
their self-proclaimed ‘light touch’ (Allen 2006: 194-197). 
 
3. Aid trauma 
 
After the initial experience of emergency aid or 
protection, a distinct social process begins in a heavily 
aid-administered country. When crisis conditions 
subside, foreign involvement in the administration and 
economic development of a sovereign country takes on 
quite a different character. Dependent and debilitating 
processes have been seen, for example, in the ‘aid 
caravans’ of post civil war Mozambique (Middleton 
and O’Keefe 1998) and newly independent Timor Leste 
(Beauvais 2001). Some common features recur in the 
transition from welcomed emergency aid to resented 
developmental management. Yet these features seem to 
be more apparent to locals than foreigners.  
 
The presence of a small, extremely highly paid foreign 
enclave of people might not in itself inflict damage on a 
developing society; nor is the obvious and well 
documented phenomenon of ‘boomerang aid’ 
(Aid/Watch 2005 , 2007) where aid money flows back to 
recipient country companies and individuals - a directly 
hostile move. However there are transmission 
mechanisms for damage. Based on the evidence of 
experienced Solomon Islands voices, we can say that 
the ‘aid caravan’ in Honiara since 2003 has also brought 
with it a number of common and highly resented 
features that we could collectively characterise as ‘aid 
trauma’. These comprise: an inflationary ‘enclave 
bubble economy’, failures in human and institutional 
capacity building and relative deprivation. 
 
The ‘disarticulation’ of economic development in poor 
countries is now well documented (e.g. Amin 1976; 
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Stokes and Anderson 1990). Enclave ‘bubble economies’ 
of the relatively large ‘aid caravans’ in small island 
states clearly contribute to this phenomenon. Benefits 
are not spread widely (due to weak ‘linkages’) yet the 
wider population is hit by inflationary pressures. Some 
analysts, explaining why the goodwill towards RAMSI 
had ‘evaporated’, pointed out that the economic 
benefits from RAMSI were in Honiara, and 
“concentrated in a few large businesses” (Roughan, 
Greener-Barcham and Barcham 2006: 2). In any case, for 
the 84% of people living in villages, RAMSI had made 
little difference, as the aid was mainly a “bubble” in the 
capital city (Roughan 2008). However there were labour 
disputes in Honiara, as some contractors tested how 
low they could push wages. Patrick Defence Logistics, 
contracted for services to the military, suddenly cut the 
wages of its local workers “from $70 a day to $32. No 
dialogue, no discussion, no comprise” (Roughan 2004b). 
One priest and long time Solomons resident, despite his 
general sympathy to foreign aid workers and to RAMSI 
as a security force, was particularly bitter about the role 
of RAMSI as a law enforcer. Rev Hooymayers has 
stated “RAMSI seemed to consider itself infallible, and 
so did the foreign contractors”. “They were both very 
much aware of their power.” RAMSI showed an 
unwillingness to scrutinise Australian contractors. 
“Everything and everyone Australian seemed to be 
sacrosanct. Criticism was not tolerated and certainly not 
appreciated. However … foreign contractors coming in 
the wake of armies are not charitable organisations and 
are in constant need of scrutiny” (Hooymayers 2008).  
 
Housing inflation in Honiara impacted heavily on 
Solomon Islanders, whose wages could not match those 
of the foreigners (even if they were paid by RAMSI). 
One community worker said this had really hurt local 
workers. “Before a small house in town would rent for 
between SI$600 and 1,000; now they are between 
SI$2,000 and 5,000. They [RAMSI personnel] are also 
buying houses.” The result has been that many 
government workers - on wages of perhaps SI$1,000 to 
2,000 per month - “are living in the squatter camps on 
the outside of town” (Wate 2008). An experienced 
journalist, Robert Iroga, agreed that RAMSI had 
changed the pattern of accommodation in Honiara. He 
has stated that “a lot of locals are displaced.” RAMSI 
personnel looked for the best houses and offered more 
money. One of his friends used to live in Nggosi, in 
west Honiara and now the capital’s most exclusive area. 
“You rarely see Solomon Islanders there now, except 
perhaps as a cleaner. It’s all Australians and their 
company managers.” Rents range from SI$15,000 to 
40,000 per month. The most a well-off Solomon Islander 
pays is about $5,000. Before RAMSI “the best house cost 
2,000 per month, now that’s [about the cost of] the 
worst” (Iroga 2008). Living as they do in a bubble 
economy, the foreigners can deal with this inflation; the 
locals, on the other hand, are excluded. 
 
This dual system creates problems in training and 
institution building. The “weak cultural engagement” 
in policing efforts and poor cultural relations generally 
(Roughan, Greener-Barcham and Barcham 2006: 2) 
translates into problems of training and ‘handing over’ 
responsibility. People are often tempted to believe that, 
as they are paid more, their role is more important. Yet 
there are repeated complaints from Solomon Islanders 
and long term residents - that locals are rejected for 
work taken by highly paid foreigners. A Catholic 
Bishop, Adrian Smith, says the Australian RAMSI 
personnel, in particular, developed a “not customer 
friendly” approach after they arrived, and that they had 
been ‘rigid’ in their role, refusing to do small tasks that 
might develop goodwill. They would probably find it 
“not easy” to hand over their responsibilities. The 
Bishop was concerned to see young people working 
“with the white man”, yet with strong differences in 
pay and conditions. The Australian often had no family 
to support. The “ugly face” of the relationship was that 
“qualified Solomon Islanders are feeling threatened, 
they [miss out on jobs and] say ‘they don’t trust us’” 
(Smith 2008). Rev Hooymayers agrees : “More [RAMSI] 
work should be done by Solomon Islanders. They have 
[the skills and] the equipment too.”  He believed “they 
must train” so as to “hand over” , but when asked if 
RAMSI people were capable of stepping back he 
replied, “I doubt it” (Hooymayers 2008). 
 
The same concern is expressed by some political 
leaders. Former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare 
says RAMSI “with no exit strategy” will create an aid 
dependency that “has the effect of numbing [the 
capacity of] political brains to think independently” 
(National Express 2008: 5). He says that, after five years, 
“very little has been done in getting the (Solomons 
police) force back on its feet” (Solomon Star 2008: 3). 
 
Similarly, some of what RAMSI considers its 
achievements are not so well appreciated. After the 
crisis, and by late 2003, over eight RSIP police had been 
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arrested, including several senior commanders (Moore 
2007: 176). Two years later an Australian official would 
boast of “the arrest of large numbers of law-breakers … 
6,300 on more than 9,100 charges” (Butler 2006: 4). 
However very few of these arrests resulted in a 
conviction; many were acquitted or released. By early 
2008, less than 200 people were in prison (Iroga 2008; 
Roughan 2008). Some see this as a reason for concern, as 
“a lot of criminals are running free because of bungled 
investigations” (Wickham 2007). However perhaps it 
was fortunate, as the Solomon Islands simply cannot 
afford to maintain a large scale prison system, nor do 
large scale prosecutions assist the national 
reconciliation process (Roughan 2008). 
 
Church leaders certainly believe that criminalisation 
and prisons have severe limits as social remedies, in the 
Solomons. One Catholic priest with over forty years 
experience in the Solomons, and 22 years as a prison 
chaplain, says “the average militant was a good man”. 
If they are to be sanctioned, they need to remain in the 
community. “It’s wrong to lock them up” (Hooymayers 
2008). A Catholic bishop says much the same: “You 
can’t rehabilitate Solomon Islanders in prison – they 
must be in the community” (Smith 2008).  
 
Resentment at ‘relative deprivation’ is the other, 
consequential element of ‘aid trauma’, especially in an 
‘emergency’ aid program that runs too long. It is well 
evident in Honiara. The neoliberal view does not see 
even serious inequality as a problem, as it is said to act 
as a motivating force in ‘market economies’ (e.g. 
Friedman and Friedman 1980). Yet criminologists and 
sociologists remind us that perceived ‘illegitimate’ 
inequality, combined with labour market instability, 
generates crime and social insecurity (Vanneman and 
Pettigrew 1972; Braithwaite 1979; Blau and Blau 1982). 
This process is underway in the Solomons. Indigenous 
analysts, including Solomon Islander Paul Roughan, 
say that  RAMSI has become a symbol of inequality and 
“relative deprivation”. It is seen as hypocritical, in 
urging austerity while “practising profligacy”, and 
remaining “opaque” on their plans while preaching 
“transparency” (Roughan, Greener-Barcham and 
Barcham 2006: 2). One angry Solomons MP put the 
resentment this way: “RAMSI has overlived its 
usefulness in [the] Solomon Islands”. They had all the 
equipment and the Solomons police had none. He 
asked whether RAMSI was boosting the economy “or 
sending their money back to Australia?” Security 
people might be needed to stay in Honiara but “not 
technical advisors that are in the ministries now.” If 
RAMSI wanted to help it should build bridges, airfields, 
wharfs and hospitals, he urged (Waipora 2008: 6). 
RAMSI pleads that such things are outside its mission 
(Solomon Star 2008: 2). However the longer a highly-
paid crisis mission stays, the more the resentment at 
this ‘relative deprivation’ is likely to build. 
 
4. ‘State building’, deep intervention 
and self-governance 
 
RAMSI’s future is contested by indigenous claims for 
self-governance, and the modernist western notion that 
an outside force is capable of carrying out a process of 
‘state building’. This view of things has been applied to 
post-war societies and invaded countries, such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet even in these cases there 
must be great doubt as to how far an outside force can 
construct state or social institutions. In the case of the 
Solomons in 2003, it was a country that had been 
independent for just twenty three years. It had set in its 
constitution important themes, such as t he reclaiming of 
natural resources and land. The crisis clearly indicates 
that this state was weak. Yet equally clearly, the process 
of state and nation-building was still underway, and 
was interrupted, when RAMSI arrived. 
 
A range of issues have been suggested as elements of 
what is often called ‘national reconciliation’ in the 
Solomon Islands, and which is sometimes referred to as 
‘state building’ in Australia. These include 
constitutional reform, devolution of some powers to the 
provinces, infrastructure development, plantation 
development on Malaita, and clarification of land 
tenure patterns (e.g. Moore 2007: 178-192). The Sikua 
government has made ‘national reconciliation’ its first 
priority, and continues the Sogavare government’s plan 
for an inquiry into land abandoned during the crisis 
(Alasia 2008). However the Australian and the Solomon 
views of this process, and RAMSI’s role in it, vary 
substantially.  
 
After the tensions between Canberra and the Sogavare 
Government, RAMSI officials seemed to retreat into 
more politically correct and modest ambitions for the 
mission. The internal RAMSI review for 2007 does not 
speak of ‘state building’, but rather ‘capacity building’ 
and simply making a “contribution to the rebuilding” 
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of the country (Winter and Schofield 2007: 5, 14, 42-43). 
Wainwright, while maintaining her theme of state 
building, came to accept that “land tenure, 
reconciliation and decentralisation” were outside the 
RAMSI brief (Wainwright 2003 & 2005). However this 
boundary decision came after some struggle. There was 
resistance from the Sogavare government to an 
Australian push to include land tenure in the RAMSI 
mandate (Sogavare 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, a strong Australian tradition of what 
could be called ‘deep interventionism’ remains. This 
links economic changes, in which Australian companies 
have interests, with the notions of ‘state building’. For 
example, Australian aid programs in the region 
(sometimes sponsored by Australian mining 
companies) have for many years included land 
registration and land ‘mobilisation’ projects (Rusanen 
2005). That theme has been maintained in the Solomons, 
despite the constitutional bar on foreigners owning 
land. 
 
Australian diplomat Nick Warner, early on, spoke of 
‘working together’ but also of RAMSI’s role in “nation 
building” which included “fundamental economic 
reform” (Warner 2004).  In the same year, Australia’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in its 
‘medium term priorities’ for the Solomons, was urging 
a standard neoliberal formula: budget cuts (“right 
sizing”), the privatisation of all state owned enterprises 
(“as soon as possible”) and the registration and 
commercialisation of land (because “customary land 
ownership places serious constraints on the growth of 
new higher value private sector activities”) (DFAT 2004: 
135).  
 
There were some Australian critics of this ‘state 
building’ enthusiasm. Oxfam urged “reflection on the 
relevance of the imposed models of statehood, and the 
way that these models were established in the colonial 
transition” (Oxfam/CAA 2003: 9). But ‘state building’ 
enthusiasm in Australia persisted. After a series of 
interviews , mostly with Australians, Fullilove from the 
Lowy Institute maintained that RAMSI’s task was 
“rebuilding a fragile state”, and constructing an 
“innovative example of state building”; though he did 
recognise that an ‘exit strategy’ was required (2006: 4, 
17-18). Morgan and McLeod (2006: 425) warned that the 
“roots of discontent continue to pervade the lives of 
Solomon Islanders” and that these would pose an 
“ongoing challenge to the maintenance of social and 
political order, and consequently to Australia’s 
attempts to build a modern Solomon Islands state”. 
McMullan and Peebles (2006) attempted to recast 
RAMSI as a function of Australia’s ‘responsibility to 
protect’ a vulnerable neighbour. This moved away from 
the threatening stance of ‘failed state’ rhetoric, where 
uninvited intervention was seen as justified. However it 
may suggest a deeper intervention than was 
contemplated. All such discussion simply begs the 
question of who is the nation builder. 
 
A return to ‘deep intervention’ notions came with a 
report from Gaurav Sodhi of the Centre for 
Independent Studies. While critical of the ‘aid caravan’, 
Sodhi (2008) restated the argument for deeper 
intervention, referring to the country’s economic 
stagnancy since independence. RAMSI intervention 
was needed in economic issues, he said. Some of this 
(infrastructure building) interested the Solomons 
Islands Government, while some of it (land 
commercialisation) was clearly linked to the persistent 
claim of foreign investors for ownership of land. 
“RAMSI has concentrated its efforts on peripheral 
problems and ignored the real constraints to growth .. 
Agriculture is the key .. without land surveys, 
registration and long term leases there can be no 
progress. Without an economic growth outlook .. 
RAMSI has no exit strategy” (Sodhi 2008). While it was 
true that RAMSI had no public exit strategy, despite the 
confusing talk of ‘state building’, by 2008 it was 
doubtful that RAMSI carried sufficient political will for 
such deep intervention. 
 
Critical Solomon Islands voices do not speak of a ‘state 
building’ role for RAMSI. They suggest the mission has 
a supportive role for the indigenous processes of 
reconciliation and nation building. RAMSI is mostly 
seen as a temporary, stabilising force. Early on, one 
Solomon Islander analyst noted that: 
“foreign intervention, while useful in the short term, 
does not offer an easy solution to internal problems. It 
might create a quasi-functioning state that is able to 
restore order … but without addressing the underlying 
causes of unrest … [the risk is] it will create a culture of 
dependency” (Kabutaulaka 2004: 7). 
These concerns were reflected by a leading community 
worker, who supports RAMSI for its security role in 
Honiara, but thinks they should go when things are 
stable. “As a mother” she says, “I like the idea they are 
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here, for example, with that last change of government” 
(which made Derek Sikua Prime Minister). She was 
fairly sure there would have been trouble in town. 
However she sees problems of dependency if they are 
here too long. On RAMSI proposing changes to land 
tenure, she says “we have enough land problems from 
outsiders”. She believes RAMSI should go when the 
security and political situation has stabilised (Wate 
2008). 
 
The dominant role of Australia is an ongoing concern. 
While some disagreed with Prime Minister Sogavare’s 
style of confrontation with Canberra, these same people 
seemed to agree with much of its substance. Bishop 
Smith, for example, would prefer that RAMSI be 
controlled by the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). However 
“if it is just Australians  ... it’s a difficult question. [Local 
people] like security but they don’t like seeing trucks of 
men with guns. If it is too Australian dominated – that’s 
not in the right direction” (Smith 2008). Journalist 
Robert Iroga, who has studied and written on the 
process of reconciliation in the Solomons, thinks that 
RAMSI can be important in helping facilitate the 
process, and also perhaps help with logistics. However 
it would be “out of place” for them to participate in 
reconciliation. “Slowly, slowly, RAMSI’s job is working 
… as we get more responsibility, they have [less need] 
to control”. He does not believe in longer term ‘law and 
order’ - or criminalisation - solutions. “Those who 
fought the war need to be involved”, and not just the 
government leaders. The reliance on money has 
‘modernised’ the process, but money has been placed 
above custom. If it’s just money, it doesn’t come “from 
the heart” and from the people that need to be 
involved, who bring it [money and ideas] to the 
process. The government might seek expert opinion 
from outsiders but “to find a really lasting option it 
must be home grown” (Iroga 2008). He is speaking of 
self-governance. 
 
5. The Solomon Islands since 
Independence 
 
Before reflecting on the future of RAMSI, it is worth 
briefly considering the progress of the Solomon Islands 
since independence in 1978. This question was raised by 
Sodhi (2008) on behalf of the inappropriately named 
Centre for Independent Studies, which is controlled by 
directors of Australia’s major banks and mining 
companies (CIS 2008). Making use of macroeconomic 
data (mainly real GDP per capita) Sodhi presents a 
‘deep intervention’ argument backed by the claim that 
the Solomon Islands has made effectively no progress in 
standards of living. This is a dramatic claim with some 
important implications. If accepted, it tends to boost the 
utilitarian argument: ‘it matters little if intervention 
interferes with political independence, as people will be 
better off’ . While accepting that rural subsistence 
lifestyles have been important in  supporting the 
population, Sodhi says “per capita income in the 
Solomon Islands has fallen since 1975” and that “the 
people of the Solomon Islands are no better off today 
than they were at independence thirty years ago” 
(Sodhi 2008). Measures are needed to boost economic 
growth, he says, including moves to increase cash 
production, which is said to require property rights in 
land, in turn said to be “essential” to the development 
of manufacturing, tourism. “At the very least”, he 
concludes, the country needs “a realistic system of 
leases to free up land” (Sodhi 2008). Certainly, the CIS 
is showing a keen interest in Solomon Islands land. 
 
The CIS report correctly observes that “lack of 
development in the Solomon Islands does not reflect a 
paucity of aid ... aid has failed to develop its economy 
or institutions.” Official Development Assistance to the 
Solomon Islands in 1990 was listed as 21.6% of GDP, 
and in 2005 as 66.5% of GDP (due to RAMSI) (UNDP 
2007: p.292). Indeed, the money measures of ODA bear 
little relation to any real development measure. 
However the CIS is dismissive of the use of Millennium 
Development Goals (broader socio-economic progress 
measures, defined by the United Nations), claiming for 
example that MDG goals on hunger and nutrition “do 
not apply to the South Pacific generally … because the 
expansion of gardens has kept up with population 
growth” (Sodhi 2008). This is a convenient but rather 
deceptive way of deflecting attention from favourable 
indicators, which might undermine the general 
argument that Solomon islanders are “no better off”. 
UN data tells us that the percentage of the population 
undernourished fell from 33% in 1990-92 to 21% in 
2002-04 (UNDP 2007: Table 7). Of course the sustaining 
nature of ‘gardens’ is underwritten by Melanesian 
customary land tenure, which ensures that the produce 
of those gardens is well distributed. Moore observes 
that subsistence production combined with “selective 
cash crops” have been “the mainstay of rural 
communities for decades” and will remain so for some 
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time. He suggests that building roads and other 
transport systems is central to improving rural 
livelihoods (Moore 2007: 191).  
 
What of the other evidence on living standards? First, 
not all published data agrees with the proposition that 
there has been no long term economic growth. UNDP 
data says average annual GDP per capita growth 
between 1975 and 2005 was +1.1%; however the 1990 to 
2005 figure was negative at -2.8% (UNDP 2007: Table 
14). Certainly there has been strong population growth, 
2.6% in recent years (World Bank 2007), which makes it 
hard for per capita incomes to keep up. However the 
fact that the country went through deep economic 
depression in the crisis of 1999 to 2002, with negative 
growth up to -15% per annum (World Bank 2007), 
makes averages rather misleading.  
 
Second, other key indicators show some very slow but 
nevertheless distinct improvements in critical social 
indicators. Infant mortality fell substantially between 
1986 and 1999 (the dates of two national censuses) and 
life expectancy rose by over 10% (see Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Some critical indicators, Solomon Islands 
1986-1999 
 1986 1999 
Infant mortality 96 66 
Total school enrolment (5-19) 34.8  56.3 
Adult literacy 48.8  76.6 (?) 
Life expectancy  54.6  61.1 
Source: GSI (2002) Solomon Islands Human development Report 
2002: building a nation, Volume 1t , Government of the 
Solomon Islands, Mark Otter, Brisbane, Tables A6, A7, A14 
 
The suggested strong improvement in adult literacy is 
probably misleading, as the census question ‘can you 
read your bible’ was most likely a matter of pride for 
most Solomon Islanders (R oughan 2008).  Indeed, mass 
education is one of the Solomons’ very weak areas, with 
falling public investment in education (UNDP 2007: 
Table 11). Nevertheless, school enrolments seem to have 
improved (Table 1) and there have been some 
improvements in healt h. Following a national plan, the 
malaria prevalence rate, at more over 400 (per 1,000 
persons) in 1992, had fallen to below 200 in 2001. These 
limited gains were made through the promotion of 
treated bednets, targeted spraying and wider drug 
treatment. Similarly, tuberculosis infection, while still a 
serious problem, was reduced from 117 (per 100,000) in 
1990 to 65 in 2000. The advances were largely through 
wider use of BCG vaccine (GSI 2002: 34-36). 
 
The point of these figures is not to suggest that the 
Solomon Islands has good socio-economic indicators, or 
that it does not have serious deficits in health and 
education. Rather, the data contradicts the claim that 
Solomon Islanders are “no better off” since 
decolonisation. These comparisons also point to the 
obsolete nature of average GDP figures as a  measure of 
socio-economic welfare, and the need to take into 
account forms of social organisation, such as public 
health campaigns, and social assets such as well 
distributed customary land and mutual support 
systems.  
 
To emphasise the weakness of average income 
measures we might consider the possibility of a large 
mining company entering a country, purchasing half 
the country’s land and exporting massive amounts of 
minerals. Would average GDP per capita rise? 
Certainly. Would people be better off? That would 
depend entirely on the distribution of benefits and costs 
of the mining operations and the change in lands 
tenure. There is a very good chance that many people 
would be worse off. We can see this disjuncture 
between economic growth and welfare precisely in the 
RAMSI experience. Economic growth in the Solomon 
Islands was given a boost by the presence of RAMSI, 
most notably in 2003 and 2004 (World Bank 2007). 
However, as we saw from the surveys and the 
inflationary elements of ‘aid trauma’, the economic 
perceptions of Solomon Islanders by 2006 were 
“generally negative”, with 87% of people complaining 
of high prices and 70% saying their economic situation 
“was worse than the year before” (ANU Enterprise 
2006: 6-9). 
 
Finally, the value of independence cannot be measured 
in either simple economic terms, nor even through 
broader socio-economic indicators. Self-governance is a 
long term project which gradually undoes the damage 
of colonialism, which crippled the growth of human 
personality, blocked the development of public 
institutions, created dependent social structures and 
aggravated poverty and inequality (e.g. Fanon 1961; 
Frank 1979; Iyer 2002). Political independence, and 
resistance to intervention, remains the central means of 
defending that healing process, as well as the gains 
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made in reclaiming and maintaining control of land and 
natural resources. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
RAMSI faces competing demands and some important 
constraints. Much of the Australian debate is still 
influenced by the shifting rationales that surrounded 
the heavily resisted invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
claims of a global ‘war against terrorism’ and missions 
of ‘state building’. Most of this is irrelevant and 
misleading in the case of the Solomon Islands. Some 
Australian observers recognise that only modest 
achievements in security assistance and assisting the 
facilitation of the domestic process can be achieved. 
Others are taking the opportunity to urge deeper 
intervention, to open investment opportunities through 
privatisation and land commercialisation. This would 
likely provoke conflict and further attacks on the 
integrity of RAMSI. 
 
In the Solomons there is one group that would like to 
see the back of the Australian-dominated mission, 
another that would like to divert RAMSI into broader 
aid programs, and a group in between which wants the 
security reassurance of RAMSI but is hurt by the 
inflationary bubble economy, failures of institution 
building and the relative deprivation that accompanies 
such a large scale, foreign ‘aid caravans’. Taken 
together, we could call these the elements of an ‘aid 
trauma’, which may become more apparent the longer 
an ‘emergency mission’ stays. 
 
The Australian presence, for its part, is constrained by 
RAMSI’s notional multilateral character (Australia 
cannot act alone, without consulting other PIF 
members) and by bureaucratic inertia. Many of those 
involved have a strong interest to maintain their 
‘mission’. Aid workers, soldiers, police, and contracted 
companies all have substantial benefits (or ‘loadings’) 
on top of their existing home salaries. Some are said to 
be investing in additional property at home through 
their very high salaries, which all contribute to the 
headline figure of ‘aid’ to the Solomon Islands. 
 
Efforts are made to not disaggregate this ‘headline aid’ 
figure. When the then Secretary of the SIG Prime 
Minister’s Department, Dr John Roughan, raised some 
questions about the RAMSI budget, former Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer gave a dramatic, ‘take it or 
leave it’ reply: “Which part of the $800 million don’t 
you want?” (Roughan 2008). If Dr Roughan had been 
less polite he might have mentioned the part that was 
inflated Australian salaries. 
 
It is not hard to imagine why many of those involved in 
RAMSI might want to stay, and might want to defend 
their mission as a valuable one. The Australian Federal 
Police (AFP), for example, through its involvement in 
several overseas missions (including Afghanistan, 
Timor Leste and the Solomons), between 2002 and 2007, 
more than doubled its budget and doubled its 
personnel. Further, the number of AFP executives  paid 
over A$200,000 per year rose from 5 to 40 in that same 
period (see Table 3). In these circumstances, with an 
extra half billion in resources (18% of that from 
privatised operations), the AFP can hardly claim to be 
providing disinterested advice about its own future role 
in RAMSI. 
 
Table 3: Australian Federal Police: expansion in 
resources, 2002-2007 
 $000 
 2001-02 2006-07 
Total revenue 408,584 1,082,350 
   From government 303,790 873,580 
   From sale of goods and 
services 
102,211 185,478 
Average staff levels 2,913 5,919 
No. of staff paid more than 
A$100K/A$130K* 
31 62* 
No. of staff paid more than 
A$200K 
5 40 
Sources: AFP 2002: 137, 162; AFP 2007:  161, 192  
 
In the Solomons, former Prime Minister Manasseh 
Sogavare has urged a review of RAMSI, separating it 
from new aid programs and reducing it to its police 
elements (Sogavare 2008). On the other hand, Prime 
Minister Derek Sikua has urged RAMSI to expand its 
role in rural areas, and “will seek RAMSI assistance to 
implement the Government's rural development 
policy” (SIG 2008). Acting RAMSI coordinator Jonathan 
Austin responded cautiously, saying the mission’s role 
was defined by the Solomons Government and the PIF. 
In response to the ‘deep interventionists’, Austin said 
RAMSI cannot ‘unilaterally’ begin reforms in such areas 
as land tenure. RAMSI had been given a strict mandate, 
he said, in three areas of law and order, economic 
governance and machinery of government. (Solomon 
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Star 2008: 2). This was not really true. RAMSI had been 
given a very wide mandate, and issues such as land 
commercialisation had indeed been raised; but 
resistance from the SIG had sidelined those issues 
(Sogavare 2008).  
 
RAMSI has no clear exit strategy. Its internal review for 
2007 observed that RAMSI would benefit from “tighter 
objectives” but worried that discussion of “exit 
strategies” can be “confrontational” and “political” 
(Winter and Schofield 2007: 5, 14, 42-43). While there is 
no urgent pressure for an exit strategy, its absence saps 
RAMSI of purpose and efficiency. On proposals for 
‘deep intervention’, there does not seem to be the 
political will, for example, to meet Australian cor porate 
demands for a move on the very popular customary 
land tenure. Whatever Canberra wants, it is constrained 
by the PIF. For their part, both the previous and the 
current Solomon Island Governments are committed to 
a commission of inquiry into abandoned properties and 
land, to deal with land abandoned during the crisis. But 
this does not have a wider agenda (Alasia 2008). RAMSI 
attempting a move on customary land tenure would 
likely generate substantial resistance in the Solomons. 
 
In these circumstances, RAMSI retains a fair measure of 
local support while it remains identified with security 
(despite the blow to its credibility in April 2006), but it 
faces significant resentment through its ‘aid trauma’ 
and the threat of destabilisation if it seeks to mov e into 
deeper, structural intervention. At the same time, the 
newly elected Australian Labor Government has 
promised an increase in aid, particularly in education 
and training, for Pacific countries (Rudd 2007). In these 
circumstances, new aid programs might best be 
organised on a bilateral basis, and not confused with 
the specific mandate of RAMSI. The mission would best 
be gradually wound down, aiming to leave at a time 
when Solomon Island communities expresses their 
confidence in resuming the task of self-governance. 
Nation building is for the people of that nation, and 
there are limits to RAMSI. 
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